This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -passivity -aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models. Our main contributions include devising systematic methods to examine passivity and identifying properties of passive dynamic models. We explain how our main results can be used to establish a connection between passivity and stability of equilibrium in population games and provide numerical simulations to illustrate stability in population games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of central interest in evolutionary game theory [1] , [2] is the study of strategic interactions among players in large populations. Each player engaged in a game chooses a strategy among a finite set of options and repeatedly revises its strategy choice in response to given payoffs. The distribution of strategy choices by the players defines the population state, and evolutionary dynamics represent the strategy revision process and prompt the time-evolution of the population state.
One of main focuses of the study is to identify asymptotes of population state trajectories induced by the dynamics and to establish stability in population games. This paper contributes by investigating a passivity -abstraction of energy conservation and dissipation -aspect of evolutionary dynamic models (EDMs) specifying the dynamics and by demonstrating how passivity yields stability in population games.
The most relevant work in literature studies various aspects of evolutionary dynamics and associated stability concepts in population games. To mention a few, Brown and von Neumann [3] studied Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics to examine the existence of optimal strategy choices in a zero-sum two-player game. Taylor and Jonker [4] studied replicator dynamics and established a connection between evolutionarily stable strategies [5] and stable equilibrium points of replicator dynamics. Later the result was strengthened by Zeeman [6] who also proposed a stability concept for games under replicator dynamics. Gilboa and Matshu [7] considered cyclic stability in games under best-response dynamics.
In succeeding work, stability results are established for broader classes of evolutionary dynamics. Swinkels [8] considered a class of myopic adjustment dynamics and studied strategic stability of Nash equilibria under these dynamics. Ritzberger and Weibull [9] considered a class of sign-preserving selection dynamics and studied asymptotic stability of faces of the population state space under these dynamics.
In a recent development of evolutionary game theory, Hofbauer and Sandholm [10] proposed stable games and established stability of Nash equilibria of these games under a large class of evolutionary dynamics. The class includes excess payoff/target (EPT) dynamics, pairwise comparison dynamics, and perturbed best response (PBR) dynamics. Fox and Shamma [11] later revealed that the aforementioned class of evolutionary dynamics exhibit passivity. Based on passivity methods from dynamical system theory, the authors established L 2 -stability of evolutionary dynamics in a generalized class of stable games. Mabrok and Shamma [12] discussed passivity for higher-order evolutionary dynamics. In particular, the authors established connection between passivity and stability in generalized stable games using robust control methods.
Apart from conventional game theory settings, passivity methods are also adopted in games over networks [13] , water distribution [14] , and microclimate applications [15] .
Inspired by passivity analysis presented in [11] , we investigate the notion of passivity for EDMs of evolutionary dynamics more in-depth. We summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows:
1) We define and characterize the notions of δ-passivity for EDMs that admit state-space representation. Based on the characterization result, we examine δ-passivity of EDMs for the replicator dynamics, EPT dynamics, pairwise comparison dynamics, and PBR dynamics. 2) We investigate properties of δ-passive EDMs in connection with payoff monotonicity and total payoff perturbation. Based on the properties, we explain how these properties are related with a strong notion of δpassivity. 3) Based on the results 1) and 2), we establish a connection between δ-passivity and asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria in population games. To further illustrate the stability result we present numerical simulations using various EDMs in population games. We organize the paper in the following way: In Section II, we present background materials on evolutionary game theory that are needed throughout the paper. In Section III, we define δ-passivity of EDMs and present an algebraic characterization of δ-passivity in terms of the vector field which describes state-space representation of EDMs. In Section IV, using the characterization result, we investigate properties of δ-passive EDMs. In Section V, we establish a connection between δ-passivity and asymptotic stability in population games, and present numerical simulation results to illustrate the stability. We end the paper with conclusions in Section VI.
A. Notation
• a i -given a vector a in R n , we denote its i-th entry as a i . • [a] + , [a i ] + -the non-negative part of a vector a = a 1 · · · a n T in R n and its i-th entry defined by [a] + def = [a 1 ] + · · · [a n ] + T and [a i ] + def = max{a i , 0}, respectively. • 1, I, e i -the vector with all entries equal to 1, the identity matrix, and the i-th column of I, respectively. 1
x f -the gradient and Hessian of a real-valued function x → f (x) with respect to x, respectively, provided that they exist. • DF -the differential of a mapping F : X → R n . • int(X), bd(X) -the (relative) interior and boundary of a set X in its affine hull, respectively. • R n + R n − -the set of n-dimensional element-wise nonnegative (non-positive) vectors. For n = 1, we omit the superscript n and adopt R + (R − ).
• · -the Euclidean norm.
II. BACKGROUND ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Consider a population of players engaged in a game where each player selects a (pure) strategy from the set of available strategies denoted by {1, · · · , n}. 2 Suppose that the population consists of a continuum of players. The population states, which describe the distribution of strategy choices by players, constitute a simplex defined by
We define a vector p in R n to represent the payoff vector assigned to each population state x in X, where p i denotes the payoff given to the players choosing strategy i. In population games, a payoff function describes how p depends on x, as exemplified in the following two examples:
Example II.1: The following are two examples of payoff functions, where F : X → R n is a continuously differentiable function.
1) Static Payoff Function [10] :
2) Smoothed Payoff Function [11] :
where, in (2), λ is a positive constant and note that when the payoff vector p(t) reaches the stationary points, it satisfies p(t) = F(x(t)).
Throughout the paper, we adopt the definition of a Nash equilibrium as follows.
Definition II.2: Given a payoff function F : X → R n , the population state x NE ∈ X is called a Nash equilibrium of F if it holds that
A. Evolutionary Dynamic Models
Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population state evolves in response to given payoffs and are specified by evolutionary dynamic models (EDMs). We focus on EDMs that admit state-space representation of the following form:
where p(t), x(t), andẋ(t) take values in R n , X, and TX, respectively. We assume that the vector field V : R n × X → TX is well-defined in a sense that it continuously depends on (p(t), x(t)), and for each initial value x(0) in X and each payoff vector trajectory p(·) : R + → R n in P, there exists a unique solution x(·) : R + → X to (3) that belongs to X, where P and X are defined by
Throughout the paper, we assume that EDMs satisfy the following path-connectedness condition.
Assumption II.3 (Path-Connectedness): We define the set of stationary points of (3) by
We assume that the set S x is path-connected for every x in X. In other words, for every p 0 , p 1 in S x , there exists a piece-wise smooth path from p 0 to p 1 that is contained in S x .
We list below a few examples of EDMs found in the literature.
Example II.4: For each i in {1, · · · , n}, 1) Replicator Dynamics [4] :
2) BNN Dynamics [3] :
3) Smith Dynamics [16] :
4) Logit Dynamics [17] :
wherep = p 1 · · ·p n T in (5) is the excess payoff vector defined asp = p − p T x1 and η in (7) is a positive constant.
Associated with Assumption II.3, it can be verified that all the EDMs described in Example II.4 satisfy the pathconnectedness assumption. For instance, consider the set S = {(p, x) | x ∈ arg max y∈X p T y} which is the set of stationary points of (5) and (6) . It can be verified that if both (p 0 , x) and (p 1 , x) belong to S then so does
B. Passivity and Stability
As it will be presented in Section III, passivity of EDMs allows us to construct an energy function which can be used to identify asymptotes of population state trajectories induced by EDMs in a class of population games. This observation explains how asymptotic stability can be established in population games.
After we present our main results on passivity, we show how passivity is connected to stability in population games and provide numerical simulation results to illustrate the stability. We defer to a future extension of this paper for in-depth stability analysis using passive EDMs in a large class of population games.
III. δ-PASSIVITY OF EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC MODEL
We proceed with defining δ-passivity of the EDM (3) and then characterize δ-passivity conditions in terms of the vector field V in (3). Using the characterization, we examine δpassivity of representative EDMs in the literature and explore important properties of δ-passive EDMs.
A. Definition of δ-Passivity
Given an EDM (3) with a payoff vector trajectory p(·) ∈ P and a resulting population state trajectory x(·) ∈ X, consider the following inequality:
where S : R n × X → R + is a real-valued function and η is a non-negative constant. Using (8), we state the definition of δ-passivity as follows.
Definition III.1: Given an EDM (3), we consider the following two cases:
1) The EDM is δ-passive if there is a continuously differentiable function S for which (8) holds with η = 0 for every p(·) in P.
2) The EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0 if there is a continuously differentiable function S for which (8) holds for every p(·) in P. 3 We refer to S as a storage function. The function S describes the energy stored in the EDM, and the δ-passivity inequality (8) suggests that the variation in the stored energy
We adopt the following definition of an informative storage function.
Definition III.2: Let S : R n × X → R + be a storage function of a δ-passive EDM (3). We call S informative if the following condition holds: For each (p, x) in R n × X,
Let us consider the following relations:
where S : R n × X → R + is a real-valued function, V is the vector field of an EDM (3), and η is a non-negative constant. In the following theorem, using (P1) and (P2), we characterize the δ-passivity condition. Theorem III.3: For a given EDM (3), the following two statements are true:
1) The EDM is δ-passive if there is a continuously differentiable function S satisfying (P1) and (P2) with η = 0.
2) The EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0 if there is a continuously differentiable function S satisfying (P1) and (P2). The proof of Theorem III.3 is given in [18] . The following are interpretations of the conditions (P1) and (P2). The condition (P1) ensures that the integral P V(p, x) · dp does not depend on the choice of the path P . This condition is an important requirement in establishing stability as discussed in [19] . The condition (P2) implies that for a constant payoff vector the population state x(t) evolves along a trajectory for which S decreases. This condition plays an important role in identifying stable stationary points of EDMs.
C. Assessment of δ-Passivity
Using Theorem III.3, we evaluate δ-passivity of the following four EDMs. The definition of a revision protocol given below is used to describe some of the EDMs.
Definition III.4: A function = ( 1 · · · n ) T is called the revision protocol in which each entry i is defined as
1) Replicator Dynamics [4] : For each i in {1, · · · , n},
Proposition III.5: The EDM (10) is not δ-passive.
2) Excess Payoff/Target (EPT) Dynamics [20] : For each i in {1, · · · , n},
wherep is the excess payoff vector defined asp = p−p T x1, and the revision protocol = ( 1 · · · n ) T satisfies the following two conditions -Integrability (I) and Acuteness (A):
where γ : R n → R is a continuously differentiable function. Note that (5) is a particular case of (11). The following proposition establishes δ-passivity of (11).
Proposition III.6: The EDM (11) is δ-passive and has an informative storage function given by S(p, x) = γ(p) where γ : R n → R + is a non-negative continuously differentiable function satisfying (I). 4 3) Pairwise Comparison Dynamics [21] : For each i in {1, · · · , n},ẋ
The revision protocol = ( 1 · · · n ) T satisfies the following condition -Sign Preservation (SP): 5
Note that (6) is a particular case of (12). The following proposition establishes δ-passivity of (12) Proposition III.7: [11] The EDM (12) is δ-passive and has an informative storage function given by [17] :
4) Perturbed Best Response (PBR) Dynamics
The function C : R n → X is defined as C(p) = arg max y∈int(X) p T y − v(y) where v : X → R is a twice 4 The proposition extends [11, Theorem 4.4] in that it requires the storage function S to be informative, which is an important requirement to establish asymptotic stability of stationary points of (11). 5 The function sgn :
continuously differentiable function satisfying the following two conditions: 6
We refer to such C and v as the choice function and (deterministic) perturbation, respectively. Note that (7) is a particular case of (13) with the perturbation v(x) = η n i=1 x i ln x i . The following proposition establishes δ-passivity of (13).
Proposition III.8: The EDM (13) is δ-passive and has an informative storage function given by
If v satisfies the following strong convexity condition then the EDM is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0:
The proofs of Propositions III.5, III.6, and III.8 are given in [18] , whereas the proof of Proposition III.7 is presented in [11] .
IV. PROPERTIES OF δ-PASSIVE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC MODELS

A. Payoff Monotonicity
Let us consider the following two conditions [10] , [22] -Nash Stationarity (NS) and Positive Correlation (PC):
We refer to EDMs satisfying (NS), (PC) as payoff monotonic. Examples of payoff monotonic EDMs are those for the EPT dynamics (11) and pairwise comparison dynamics (12) . To provide an intuition behind payoff monotinicity, consider a payoff monotonic EDM with a constant payoff p(t) = p 0 , ∀t ≥ 0. The population state x(t) induced by the EDM evolves along the directionẋ(t) that monotonically increases the average payoff, and it becomes stationary when it reaches the state attaining the maximum average payoff.
The following two propositions describe important properties of δ-passive EDMs in connection with payoff monotonicity.
Proposition IV.1: For a given δ-passive EDM, let S be its storage function and S = {(p, x) | V(p, x) = 0} be its stationary points. Provided that {(p, x) | S(p, x) = 0} is not empty, it holds that {(p, x) | S(p, x) = 0} ⊆ S and the equality holds if the EDM satisfies (NS).
Proposition IV.2: Suppose that n ≥ 3. No EDM can be both strictly output δ-passive and payoff monotonic.
According to Proposition IV.2 and the fact that (11) and (12) are payoff monotonic, we can state the following corollary.
The proofs of Propositions IV.1 and IV.2 are given in [18] .
Corollary IV.3: The EDMs (11) and (12) are not strictly output δ-passive.
Proposition IV.2 has the following implication: In Section V we will observe that strictly output δ-passive EDMs achieve stability in a larger class of population games than do (ordinary) δ-passive EDMs. Besides, the payoff monotonicity ensures that the population state x(t) evolves toward Nash equilibria. Based on these observations, strict output δpassivity and payoff monotonicty are preferred attributes of EDMs; however, the proposition states that these two attributes are not compatible.
B. Effect of Total Payoff Perturbation
Motivated by our analysis on the PBR dynamics in Section III-C.4, we investigate the effect of perturbation on δpassivity of EDMs. For this purpose, consider the total payoff function u : R n × X → R defined by
where v : X → R is a twice continuously differentiable function satisfying the following two conditions:
where η is a positive constant. We refer to v as a deterministic perturbation [23] or control cost [24] . Notice that without the perturbation (v = 0), the total payoff (15) coincides with the average payoff p T x. 7 In what follows, we investigate the effect of perturbation on δ-passivity using a certain class of EDMs whose statespace representation is given as follows: 8
where the function ξ ji : X → TX assigns a tangent vector to each x in X, and ji : R n → R n is called a revision protocol which depends on a directional derivative of the total payoff. We refer to (17) as perturbed if the perturbation v satisfies the conditions (16) , and as unperturbed if v = 0.
The following are examples of (17) .
∇ T x u(p(t), x(t)) (e j − x(t)) + (18) 7 The idea of imposing perturbations on the average payoff appeared in game theory and economics to investigate the effect of random perturbations or disutility on choice models [17] , [23] , [24] , to model human choice behavior [25] , and to analyze the effect of social norms in economic problems [26] . 8 We note that the EDM of the PBR dynamics is not of the form (17) , and our analysis given in Section IV-B complements the δ-passivity analysis on the PBR dynamics.ẋ
∇ T x u(p(t), x(t)) (e j − e i ) + (19) Note that the unperturbed EDMs (18) and (19) coincide with (5) and (6), respectively. Thus, according to Propositions III.6 and III.7, with v = 0, (18) and (19) are δ-passive EDMs. For the case where v satisfies (16) , the perturbed EDMs (18) and (19) are strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0.
In the following proposition, we generalize this observation using (17) .
Proposition IV.4: Given an EDM (17) , suppose that the EDM is δ-passive when v = 0. If v satisfies (16) , then the perturbed EDM (17) is strictly output δ-passive with index η > 0.
The proof is given in [18] .
V. STABILITY OF δ-PASSIVE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC MODELS
In this section, we investigate how δ-passivity is connected to asymptotic stability in population games.
A. Stability in Population Games
Consider the following closed-loop configuration of a static payoff function (1) and δ-passive EDM (3):
where the continuously differentiable mapping F : X → R n satisfies z T DF(x)z ≤ z T z with ≥ 0 for all (x, z) in X × TX, and the storage function S of the EDM is informative. The following proposition establishes asymptotic stability of the equilibrium points {x ∈ X | V(F(x), x) = 0} of (20) . Proposition V.1: Consider the closed-loop (20) . The equilibrium points of (20) are asymptotically stable if either of the following conditions holds:
1) The EDM (3) is δ-passive and = 0.
2) The EDM (3) is strictly output δ-passive with index η satisfying η > . The proof of Proposition V.1 is given in [18] . Note that under (NS) Proposition V.1 essentially establishes asymptotic stability of Nash equilibria of F.
Proposition V.1 shows that δ-passivity is a sufficient condition for stability in population games with static payoff functions (1) . In what follows, we investigate whether δpassivity is also a necessary condition for stability. To this end, let us consider the following closed-loop configuration of a variant of the smoothed payoff (2) and an EDM (3) satisfying (NS):ṗ (t) = F(x(t)) − 1 n 11 T p(t) (21a)
where F : int(X) → R n is defined by
with a continuously differentiable concave function f : X → R and positive constants {a i } n i=1 . Note that F can be interpreted as a perturbed payoff function for a concave potential game in which the perturbation is described by n i=1 x i ln ai xi . At a stationary point (p, x) of (21), the payoff vector p satisfies p = F(x), and the population state x is a Nash equilibrium of the game 9 which satisfies the following relation:
In the following proposition, we show that δ-passivity of EDMs is equivalent to Lyapunov stability in population games with the smoothed payoff (21a).
Proposition V.2: Consider the closed-loop (21) . The EDM (21b) is δ-passive and its storage function is informative if and only if for every smoothed payoff (21a), there exists a function E : R n × X → R + for which the following holds:
xi . The proof of Proposition V.2 is given in [18] . In fact, assuming that x(t) stays in a compact subset of int(X) and F has a unique Nash equilibrium, 1) and 2) of Proposition V.2 yield that the state ( F(x NE ), x NE ) is asymptotically stable.
B. Numerical Simulations
In this section, we present numerical simulations to illustrate our stability results. We aim to show that the population state trajectory of a closed-loop formed by an EDM and a population game converges to a Nash equilibrium when the conditions of Proposition V.1 hold. Also we provide an example where the violation of such conditions lead to instability of a Nash equilibrium.
Additionally, based on Proposition V.2, we illustrate that the population state trajectory of a closed-loop formed by the replicator dynamics, which is not δ-passive, and the smoothed payoff dynamics (21a) converges to a limit cycle and does not converge to the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed payoff function F. On the other hand, under the same payoff dynamics, a typical δ-passive EDM such as the EDM of the BNN dynamics induces the state trajectory that converges to the Nash equilibrium.
We begin with the first scenario where we consider the BNN dynamics (5) and the logit dynamics (7) in the Hypnodisk game [22] whose payoff function is given by 9 Note that due to the perturbation
, Nash equilibrium is in the interior of X.
The mapping H = (H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ) is defined by
It can be verified that there is a constant η > 0 for (7) for which 2) in Proposition V.1 holds and the population state x(t) converges to the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed payoff function H defined by
On the other hand, the BNN dynamics in the Hypnodisk game does not satisfy both conditions in Proposition V.1.
Numerical simulation results for the two cases are given in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. As the figures illustrate the population state trajectories of (7) under (22) converge to the Nash equilibrium of H whereas those of (5) under (22) do not.
In the second scenario, we consider the replicator dynamics (4) and the BNN dynamics (5) in a feedback configuration (21) with the smoothed payoff dynamics (21a), where the perturbed payoff function F in (21a) is defined by
Note that according to Proposition V.2 and δ-passivity of (5), we can construct a Lyapunov function E and establish asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium of F whereas (4) is not δ-passive (see Proposition III.5) and Proposition V.2 does not apply to (4) .
Numerical simulation results for the two cases are given in Fig. 1 (c) and (d), respectively. As the figures illustrate the population state trajectory of (5) under (21a) converges to the Nash equilibrium of F whereas that of (4) under (21a) oscillates around and does not converge to the Nash equilibrium.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated δ-passivity of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We defined and characterized δ-passivity using the state-space representation of (a) Multiple population state trajectories induced by the logit dynamics with different initial conditions in the Hypnodisk game, and the storage function evaluated along one of the trajectories. EDMs. Based on the characterization, we studied certain properties of δ-passive EDMs and demonstrated how δpassivity can be used to establish stability in population games. As future work, it would be interesting to further investigate stability of EDMs in a generalized class of population games in which various higher-order dynamics and/or delay are involved.
